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burden, additional facilities are a ready solution; if they are directed to
the possible impairment of the relation between the offender and the pro-
bation officer, his recommendation of remission can foreclose that danger
whenever it threatens.
CONCLusIoN
In addition to whatever its retributive, deterrent and rehabilitative
effects may be, the criminal fine could find justification for its use in a sys-
tem of remuneration for the victims of crimes. Such a system, being a
species of restitution,124 is subject to the sundry difficulties which confront
the genre. Should, foi example, the criminal courts move increasingly into
a field which has hitherto (at least in recent times) been preoccupied by
the civil remedy? If so, what degrees of proof should be required of the
claimant, and what administrative procedures for maintenance of the pro-
gram should be established? Such difficulties are not insuperable, and
should not impede further consideration and experiment. Unless innova-
tions of the type suggested herein are instituted, serious thought should
be given to a proposal that fines be abolished or severely restricted in
application; for present use of them seems rather promiscuous.*
LABOR FACES THE AMENDED ANTI-RACKETEERING
ACT
In United States v. Kemble,' the first application of the amended Fed-
eral Anti-Racketeering Act 2 (Hobbs Act), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the conviction of a union business
agent for attempted extortion. The agent had used violence and threats
in an effort to exact wages for "imposed, unwanted, and superfluous" serv-
ices. This decision suggests that the Hobbs Act may be a potent anti-
labor weapon with its imposing maximum penalty of twenty years im-
prisonment. It is particularly significant in light of the judicial reticence
that marked the interpretation of other federal legislation aimed with greater
specificity and less severity at improper wage exactions.
124. Payment into the fund by a defendant whose conduct has caused no material
damage, of course, will not be restitution; but the system can be viewed as reparation
by the group of offenders for the group's wrongs.
* Also considt: BEST, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
(1930); ORCHARD, THE FINE SYSTEM (1917); SEN. Doc. No. 181, 54th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1896) (report of United States delegates to the Fifth International Prison
Congress, Paris, 1895) ; ROBINSON, PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) ; 1 STUDY
OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAl. COURTS (1934) ; Fines, 36 C.J.S. 780 (1943).
1. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. deded, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 420(a) (1946) ; reenacted without consequential change, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (Supp. 1952). See Legis. 35 GEo. L.J. 362 (1947) and Note, 25 N.C.L.
REv. 58 (1946).
1953] LABOR FACES AMENDED ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT 1031
In 1946, just a few months before the passage of the Hobbs Act, Con-
gress approved the Lea Act,3 which was designed to stifle featherbedding
practices forced upon the radio industry by the powerful American Federa-
tion of Musicians. The broad provisions of the statute set a maximum
penalty of two years for the exaction of wages for work not done or for
work done but unnecessary to efficient operation by the employer.4 How-
ever, the only prosecution under the Act met with little success. After the
Supreme Court of the United States had sustained the statute's constitu-
tionality,5 the indictment subsequently was dismissed by the district
court 0 on the grounds that (1) the featherbedding demands were proper
under a saving proviso relating to contractual obligations, (2) a strike to
enforce these demands did not involve the requisite coercive activity, and
(3) there was no evidence that the defendant knew that the employment
demanded was unnecessary.
In 1947, on the day on which the Supreme Court passed upon the
constitutionality of the Lea Act, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act',
containing the only other express federal prohibition of the improper exac-
tion of wages. Section 8(b) made it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to cause or attempt to cause any employer to
pay, in the nature of ar exaction, for services not performed or to be per-
formed.8 Two recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting this provision
have cast doubt upon its future utility. In American Newspaper Publishers
Association v. NLRB,9 where the International Typographical Union
forced publishers to pay for bogus type setting, the Court decided that
the featherbedding provision of the Act was not violated despite the fact
that the bogus type was valueless to the publishers. In NLRB v. Gamble
Enterprises, Inc.,10 the American Federation of Musicians had demanded
without success that local orchestras be hired to play overtures, "inter-
missions," and "chasers" when traveling bands performed. The Court held
3. 60 STAT. 89, 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1946).
4. Under the Act, it is a crime to compel a licensee by "force, violence, intimi-
dation, or duress" to: (1) hire more men than it needs; (2) pay for men who are
neither working nor needed; (3) pay more than once for services performed; (4) pay
at all for services not to be performed; (5) refrain from broadcasting without
paid performance; (6) refrain from broadcasting foreign programs. It also prohibits
obstructing the use of technological devices.
5. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The District Court had held
that the statute was unconstiutional on four grounds: (1) that there was no definite
standard to determine whether work is unnecessary to efficient operation by the em-
ployer; (2) that there was a violation of equal protection because the statute ap-
plied only to the radio industry; (3) that there was a violation of freedom of speech
where the statute was applied to picketing; and (4) that there was slavery and
involuntary servitude where the Act was applied to striking. United States v.
Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. I1. 1946). The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court. on the first two grounds and by-passed the others as prematurely raised.
6. United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
7. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1952).
8. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (c) (Supp. 1952). See Note, 52
CoL L. REv. 1021 (1952).
9. 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
10. 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
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that the featherbedding section of the statute was inapplicable although the
local bands were unwanted and unnecessary. In these cases, the feather-
bedding provision of Taft-Hartley was held not to apply when work is done
or offered to be done as consideration for wages exacted or attempted to
be exacted, although this work is "imposed, unwanted, and unnecessary"
to efficient operation by the employer. In light of the impotency of the
Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts as weapons against questionable wage exac-
tions, the scope of extortion under the Hobbs Act is of utmost significance
to organized labor.
THE ORIGINAL ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT INTERPRETED
The original Anti-Racketeering Act 11 passed in 1934 proscribed the
obstruction of interstate commerce caused by exacting money through force,
violence or coercion [§ 2(a)] and by obtaining "the property of another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear" [§2(b)].
Provisos to these sections stated that exacting money and property did not
include the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide
employee. Section 6, modifying the Act as a whole, preserved the rights
of bona fide labor organizations lawfully carrying out their legitimate
objects.
Two important cases helped set the outer limits beyond which neither
the wage provisos nor § 6 would extend protection to labor activity. In
United States v. Compagna 2 union leaders personally exacted payments
from theatre owners by threatening to call union cameramen out on strike.
In Nick v. United States,18 union leaders agreed to a reasonable wage con-
tract only after a pay-off promise, which was subsequently enforced by a
threat to strike. Since both cases involved individual enrichment rather
than union benefit, the convictions were upheld despite the labor safe-
guards.
In United States v. Local 807, I.B.T.,14 where union members by
actual and threatened physical violence exacted helpers' wages from truck-
ers entering New York City, whether or not their labor was utilized, con-
victions were reversed on the strength of the wage provisos. The provisos
were held by the Supreme Court to include payments to union members
who, like stand-by musicians, either worked, although their services were
unwanted, or made bona fide offers to work, although their services were
refused.' 5 Only payments to union members who refused to work or whose
11. 48 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 420(a) (1940).
12. 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. deied, 324 U.S. 867 (1945).
13. 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
14. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
15. The Court said, "The Circuit Court has referred to the 'stand-by' orchestra
device, by which a union local requires that its members be substituted for visiting
musicians, or, if the producer or conductor insists upon using his own musicians, that
the members of the local be paid the sums which they would have earned had they
performed. That similar devices are employed in other trades is well-known. It
is admitted here that the stand-by musician has a 'job' even though he renders
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work or offer to work was a sham, were held to be beyond traditional labor
activity and outside the wage provisos.' 6
THE HOBBs ACT INTERPRETED
In response to this restrictive interpretation of the statute,17 Congress
passed the Hobbs Act,' 8 which amended the Anti-Racketeering Act in at
least four ways. (1) Robbery and extortion were made the basic crimes.
(2) Extortion was defined as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear." This definition is similar to the language of § 2(b)
of the earlier Act, except for the italicized words, which apparently were
added to incorporate § 2(a). (3) The wage provisos were omitted. (4)
no actual service. There can be no question that he demands the payment of money
regardless of management's willingness to accept his labor. If, as it is agreed, the
musician would escape punishment under this Act even though he obtained his
'stand-by job' by force or threats, it is certainly difflicidt to see how a teai ster
could be punished for engaging in the sane practice." Id. at 535. (Italics added).
16. The Court concluded, "We do not mean that an offer to work or even
the actual performance of some services necessarily entitles one to immunity under
the exception [the wage provisions]. A jury might of course find that such an offer
or performance was no more than a sham to disguise an actual intention to extort
and to blackmail. But the inquiry must nevertheless be directed to whether this was
the purpose of the accused or whether they honestly intended to obtain a chance to
work for a wage." Id. at 534.
17. Opening the debate on the House floor, Congressman Hancock said, "This
bill is made necessary by the amazing decision of the Supreme Court in the [Local
807] case . . . 3 years ago. That decision practically nullified the antiracketeering
bill of 1934. In effect it legalizes in certain labor disputes the use of robbery and
extortion .... The Supreme Court held that . . . members [of the union] . . .
were exempt from the provisions of that law when attempting by the use of force
or the threat of violence to obtain wages for a job whether they rendered any
services or not. . . We think a mistake was made by the Supreme Court, we
are attempting to correct it through enacting a new law ... " 91 CoNG. R c. 11900
(1945).
Congressman Summers said, "I quote from the [Local 8071 decision: 'As we
have said, the jury was bound to acquit the defendants if it found that their ob-
jective and purpose was to obtain by the use or threat of violence the chance to
work for the money but to accept the money even if the employers refused to permit
them to work. . . .' It was the purpose of the Judiciary Committee to prevent
the rendition of that sort of decision by any court in the future, so the language
upon which that holding was based was eliminated." Id. at 11909.
Congressman Rivers said, "As one member of the bar, I disagree with the
reasoning in [807] . . . . I call the procedure referred to in this case . . . nothing
short of hijacking, intimidation, extortion, and out-and-out highway robbery ...
The Hobbs bill . . . protects interstate commerce from procedures of this nature."
Id. at 11917.
Congressman Whittington said, "The bill is to prevent a repetition of the physical
violences by members of labor unions on those engaged in interstate commerce. It
is to prevent a repetition of the assaults and attacks upon the drivers of trucks with
produce entering New York City and similar cases." Id. at 11913.
In opposition to an amendment by Congressman Cellers which would have re-
stored the original wage proviso, Congressman Jennings said, "That proviso would
render it necessary, if this bill accomplished its purpose, for the Supreme Court to
annul its opinion in the case where they emasculated the statute before." Congress-
man Hobbs said, "Of course it would. Such words have already been passed on
by the Supreme Court in the Local 807 case. . . ." Id. at 11914. The Celler
Amendment was rejected by the House. Id. at 11917.
18. See note 2 supra.
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Section 6 was also omitted, but Title Two was inserted as a substitute
protection for legitimate labor activities. It provided that the amended
Act "shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect" the Clayton, Norris-
LaGuardia, Railway Labor, and amended Wagner (Taft-Hartley) Acts.1
The Kemble Case.-In United States v. Kemble,20 the first applica-
tion of the amended Act, both a union and its business agent were con-
victed of attempted extortion. The agent had used violence and threats in
an effort to force a trucker to hire a union helper and pay him a full day's
wages, the trucker having nearly completed the unloading of a delivery from
his employer at a plant where the union had a closed shop contract.21 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction
of the agent, 4-3, and reversed that of the union, 5-2. In regard to the
agent the majority ruled that, because of the breadth of the statutory phrase
"the obtaining of property from another" and because of the legislative
history behind the omission of the wage provisos, 23 an attempt to force
the payment of wages for "imposed, unwanted and superfluous services"
was an attempt to extort.24  Although the court read into the statute the
provisions of § 6 of the original Act which preserved the rights of bona
fide labor organizations lawfzully carrying out their legitimate objects,
it held that no state or federal sanction made the agent's violence lawful.25
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) (Supp. 1952). Although the Taft-Hartley Act had
not been passed when Hobbs became law, it was enacted before Hobbs was amended,
and is included in Title Two as the amended Wagner Act.
20. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. dnied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
21. Judge McLaughlin, dissenting, inferred that this contract required that union
members unload trucks at the plant; however, the trucker's employer was probably
not a party to the contract.
22. In regard to the union, the majority applied § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act which provides that a labor organization cannot "be held responsible . . . for
the unlawful acts of . . . agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation
in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof." 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1946). As interpreted
in United Brotherhood v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), this section imposes
very stringent requirements of proof. The instant court held that there was no such
clear proof, even though the secretary-treasurer of the union threatened trouble at
the plant shortly after Kemble's violence if the non-union loading continued. More-
over, the court stated that, regardless of the strict requirments of proof imposed
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the evidence did not satisfy the less stringent require-
ments imposed by the usual rules of criminal responsibility for the acts of agents.
Judge Staley concluded in his dissent that the evidence was sufficient if the
agent's conduct was extortion, since then the stringent requirements of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, applying only to labor disputes, would not be involved. This rea-
soning emasculates Norris-LaGuardia since it permits an agent to exceed his au-
thority, limited to the creation of a peaceful labor dispute, and removes those very
safeguards provided for principals when agents exceed their authority.
It is suggested that even under the Norris-LaGuardia Act a conviction of a
union may be possible without a membership vote authorizing or ratifying an agent's
violence, if this violence is authorized by a long standing custom or is participated
in by a great number of union members. The Court in the Brotherhood case said
that "custom or traditional practice of a particular union can also be a source of
actual authorization of an officer to act for and bind the union." 330 U.S. 395, 410
(1946). Likewise, mass membership participation would seem to indicate union
participation.
23. See note 17 szq'ra.
24. 198 F.2d 889, 892 (3d Cir. 1952).
25. Ibid.
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THE HOBBs AcT ANALYZED
The "extortion" punished by the Hobbs Act must be considered by
four lines of inquiry: (1) are wages the type of "property" that can be
extorted; (2) what is the requisite coercive activity; (3) what is the requi-
site criminal intent; (4) what are the safeguards of Title Two as an out-
side limit to labor prosecution.
Property
The Kemble case held that, because of the legislative history behind
the omission of the wage provisos, the broad prohibition of "the obtaining
of property" included securing the payment of wages for "imposed, un-
wanted and superfluous services." 26 As a matter of semantics it would
seem that all wage exactions fit equally well within the broad requirements
of "property." Moreover, there is no legislative history indicating that
certain wage exactions do not involve "the obtaining of property." It is
difficult to justify a limitation on the Act if the limitation is to be found
in this clause. Such a conclusion is not altered by considering a wage
exaction as the exaction of a job.2 7 In substance the property involved
is an employer's money 28 Legislative history indicates that the law of
extortion is not to be distorted merely because labor activity is in question.2 9
The Requisite Coercive Activity
Violence.-The agent in the Kemble case swore at the trucker, threat-
ened him physically, pushed crates toward his feet, and let air out of his
tires. Clearly this constitutes "actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear .... 30
Striking or Picketing.-Section 2 (a) of the old Act punished the exac-
tion of money through "coercion." 3 1 Both the Compagna and Nick
cases 3 2 held that threats to strike constituted the necessary coercion. How-
26. Ibid.
27. Cf. People v. Warden of City Prison 145 App. Div. 861, 130 N.Y. Supp.
698 (1st Dep't 1911) ("property" in the New York extortion statute includes the
right to employment). But cf. People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318, 271 N.Y. Supp.
450 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1934), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 694, 277 N.Y. Supp. 960 (1935).
28. Compare Regina v. Bull, 13 Cox C.C. 608 (1877) (obtaining money by false
pretenses).
29. Congressman Gwynne said, "This bill simply would protect interstate com-
merce from robbery and extortion, no matter by whom these crimes were committed."
91 CONG. REc. 11904 (1945).
Congressman Whittington said, "It punishes extortion and robbery no matter
by whom committed. . . ." Id. at 11913.
Congressman Hobbs said, "Crime is crime, no matter who commits it. Robbery
is robbery and extortion is extortion, whether or not the perpetrator has a union card
in his pocket. . . ." Id. at 11912.
30. See text after note 18 supra.
31. See text at note 11 supra.
32. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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ever, the word "coercion" was omitted from the Hobbs Act.3 3  It is
therefore arguable that threats to strike (and, a fortiori, picketing) are
not now punishable, even in the Compagna-Nick situations. There is legis-
lative history to support this position.34 However, the omission of the
word "coercion" should not be given so radical an effect. The New
York extortion statute,3 5 which served as the prototype for the Hobbs
Act,36 also does not punish "coercion!' per se, but under it situations like
Compagna and Nick have been held to be extortion on the grounds that
threats to strike, and perhaps picketing, create a "fear" of injury to
business property.37  The instilling of "fear" is also punishable by the
Hobbs Act 8 although it omits the New York Act's lengthy definition
of "threats which constitute fear," including "fear of unlawful injury to
property." However, this omission would seem to be immaterial in light
of the fact that fear of injury to property is so thoroughly ingrained in
typical extortion statutes,39 that it is now implicit. Moreover, the propo-
sition is weak that the Hobbs Act applies only to the strong-arm racketeer-
ing methods which existed in the Local 807 case, where the truckers were
forced to purchase immunity from physical violence. The Act was passed
to extend, not restrict, federal anti-racketeering legislation 40 and racketeer-
ing objectives also can be accomplished by apparently legitimate union
means. It therefore seems probable that the Campagna and Nick situa-
tions, involving threats to strike, contain the requisite coercive activity
33. The possiblity that striking and picketing would constitute "coercion"' was
brought to the attention of the House Committee which proposed the Hobbs Act,
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
5218, H.R. 6752, H.R. 6872, H.R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, 227, 234 (1942).
Congressman Thorn proposed that "coercion" be deleted. Id. at 158.
34. Congresswoman Summer stated that "There have been complaints that in the
case of strikes an attorney has gone in and asked an operator for something like
$15,000 or $20,000 . . . to stop a strike. Is there anything in this bill about that?"
Congressman Jennings: "Not a thing. This does not have a thing in the world to
do with strikes." 91 CONG. REc. 11912 (1946).
Congressman Gwynne stated that the taking must be "by violence, by personal
violence, or by actual threats of personal violence. . . ." Id. at 11903.
Congressman Hancock said the Act "cannot apply to a threatened strike because
strikes are lawful, they are not wrongful." Id. at 11902.
35. N.Y. PENAL CoDE § 850.
36. Congressman Hancock said, "The bill contains definitions of robbery and
extortion which follow the definitions contained in the laws of the State of New
York." 91 CONG. Ec. 11900 (1946).
Congressman Hobbs said, "The definitions in this bill are copied from the New
York Code substantially." Ibid.
37. People v. Lamm, 292 N.Y. 224, 54 N.E.2d 374 (1944) (threats to keep
union members out of a certain working area) ; People v. Bernoff, 292 N.Y. 230, 54
N.E.2d 376 (1944) (threats to call and actually calling strikes); People v. Wein-
seimer, 117 App. Div. 603, 102 N.Y. Supp. 579 (1st Dep't 1907) (threats to continue
a strike) ; People v. Wilzig, 4 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 403, 414, 416 (1886) (a peaceful
boycott).
38. See text after note 18 supra. The possibility that striking would constitute
"fear" was brought to the attention of the House Committee which proposed the
Hobbs Act, but without response. Hearings, supra note 33, at 127.
39. See comment, 44 MIcH. L. Rv. 461, 463 (1945).
40. See note 17 supra.
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under the Hobbs Act. Furthermore, the coercive characteristics of a threat
to strike do not necessarily depend upon the nature of the labor objective.
Any threat to strike may be equally as coercive although a proper objective
is in mind. Picketing, however, is perhaps not as inherently coercive.
41
Criminal Intent
The original Anti-Racketeering Act defined "wrongful" to be "in
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or Ter-
ritory." 4 No cases construed this definition, and the Hobbs Act omitted
it. This omission may mean that "wrongful" does not necessitate a showing
of unlawfulness under other criminal legislation.43 But, even so, "wrong-
ful" probably does necessitate a showing of criminal intent (public wrong)
rather than mere tortious intent (private wrong). 44 The New York
extortion statute requires proof a criminal intent.45  Moreover, it was
held in Morissette v. United States 46 that where a statute omits a crim-
inal intent traditionally included in common law and statutory law,
Congress will be presumed to have intended to include it, absent a contrary
direction.
Traditional Criminal Law Claim-of-right.-Under extortion statutes of
the New York type some courts have held that criminal intent requires
merely the showing of wrongful means.47  They have rejected the possi-
bility that criminal intent may be negated, in certain limited circumstances,
by a showing of a bona fide claim of right to the end involved, even though
the means are wrongful. Apparently the majority in the Kemble case
41. Compare Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950) wvith Swenson
v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash.2d 193, 206, 177 P.2d 873, 880 (1947). It
should be noted that where the coercive activity is striking or picketing, an extortion
conviction under the Hobbs Act is probably not precluded by the Federal Constitu-
tion. Compare Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926), and Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) wvith the district court's holding under the
Lea Act, see note 5 supra.
42. 18 U.S.C. §420b(a) (1940).
43. This omission was brought to the attention of the House Committee which
proposed the Hobbs Act, Hearings, supra note 33, at 196. No explanation was given
by the Committee.
44. Chief Judge Biggs, dissenting in the Kemble case, so concluded. He would
have reversed the conviction of the agent since the trial court merely read the Hobbs
Act without giving a specific instruction requiring proof of a criminal rather than
a tortious intent. The majority affirmed the conviction of the agent without men-
tioning the problem of criminal intent. It perhaps felt that the requirement of a
criminal rather than a tortious intent was self-evident to a jury. Cf. State v.
Louanis, 79 Vt. 463, 65 Atl. 532, 534 (1907) : "It was not necessary for the court to
define 'extort' to the jury. It is a common word, used in the statute in its ordinary
sense, and the court might well assume that the jury understood it."
45. People v. Gassman, 182 Misc. 878, 885-886, 45 N.Y.S.2d 709, 715 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1943) ; People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318, 271 N.Y. Supp. 450 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1934), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 694, 277 N.Y. Supp. 960 (1935); People v. Feld, 262
App. Div. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1941); People v. Weinseimer, 117 App. Div. 603,
102 N.Y. Supp. 599 (1st Dep't 1907).
46. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See also Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d
321, 324 (5th Cir. 1931), "the general rule is that in all statutory crimes involving
moral turpitude criminal intent is an implied, necessary ingredient."
47. In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W. 761 (1911); People v. Beggs, 178
Cal. 79, 172 Pac. 152 (1918) ; State v. Phillips, 62 Idaho 656, 115 P.2d 418 (1941).
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adopted this view.48 The New York courts, however, are probably com-
mitted to a claim-of-right approach,49 which would seem to be the better
one. The common element of the law of theft is a taking of property with
a felonious intent. 0 Felonious intent may be negated by a showing of
claim-of-right to the property obtained, whether the crime is larceny, 1
or embezzlement 52 where the offense is against property alone, or rob-
bery "  where the offense is against both person and property. Extortion
is merely a species of aggravated theft, almost indistinguishable from
robbery.5 4  Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that a legitimate
48. Judge Staley, in dissent would have required a showing of both wrongful
means and ends.
49. See cases at note 45 szipra. See also People v. Sheridan, 186 App. Div. 211,
174 N.Y. Supp. 327 (2d Dep't 1919) where a charge as to defendant's claim of right
only to the means used was refused. Felonious intent was required under an earlier
New York extortion statute. See People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427 (N.Y. 1848). Note
also that it is essential under the New York statute punishing the taking of unlawful
fees by a public officer; see People v. Clark, 242 N.Y. 313, 151 N.E. 631 (1925). Cf.
People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 26 N.E. 267 (1891) where it was held that the law
will not presume the criminal intent necessary to a conspiracy conviction from the
doing of an unlawful act.
50. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260-261 (1952).
51. State v. Sawyer, 95 Conn. 34, 110 Atl. 461 (1920) ; Thomas v. Kessler, 334
Pa. 7, 5 A.2d 187 (1933); People v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 N.W. 770
(1934) ; People v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30 Pac. 378 (1892) (statute requires felonious
intent).
52. Ridge v. State, 192 Ind. 639, 137 N.E. 758 (1923); People v. Parker, 355
Ill. 258, 189 N.E. 352 (1934); Brown v. State, 92 Fla. 538, 109 So. 438 (1926)
(statute requires felonious intent).
53. Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 133 S.E. 764 (1926); People v.
Erlandson, 360 Ill. 214, 195 N.E. 670 (1935) ; People v. Sheasbey, 82 Cal. App. 459,
255 Pac. 836 (1927) (statute requires felonious intent) ; cf. Moyers v. State, 186
Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938).
54. The Commisioners who drafted the New York Penal Code stated that "Four
of the crimes affecting property, require to be somewhat carefully distinguished;
robbery, larceny, extortion and embezzlement. The leading distinctions between
these, in the view taken by the Commissioners, may be briefly stated thus; All
four include the criminal acquisition of the property of another. In robbery this is
accomplished by means of force or fear and by overcoming or disregarding the
will of the rightful possessor. There is a taking of property from another against
his consent; the physical power to resist being overcome by force, or what is equiva-
lent in law, the moral power to refuse being prostrated by fear. In larceny there
is still a taking butit is accomplished by fraud or stealth; the property is taken, not
against the consent of the owner, but without it. In extortion there is again a taking.
Now it is with the consent of the party injured; but this is a consent induced by
threats, or under color of some official right ... CommssioNEas' REPoRT,
NEw YORK PENAL CODE § 584 (1865).
Thus, extortion was included to supplement robbery by penalizing a taking
with the consent of the owner, People v. Barondess, 61 Hun 571, 576, 16 N.Y.
Supp. 436, 438 (1st Dep't 1891). The court in In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W.
761 (1911) was mistaken in its conclusion that extortion is merely a lesser degree
of robbery, requiring a showing only of wrongful means. The New York Com-
missioners gave no indication that extortion, unlike robbery, see note 55 infra, does
not require proof of a felonious intent. Quite to the contrary, their brief note to
extortion, see § 613, cites only one case, People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. 1827) ;
there the court instructed the jury that extortion under color of official right demands
a showing of a corrupt intent which may be negated by a claim of right. It is
significant also that Congress, in borrowing the New York definitions of robbery
and extortion, see note 36 supra, imposed the same maximum penalty for both
crimes. It is difficult to conclude that Congress considered extortion merely a lesser
degree of robbery, requiring a showing only of wrongful means, particularly in light
of the severity of punishment.
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defense to extortion is the absence of wrongful ends, particularly in light
of the Morissette case. 5
Of the limited number of objectives which negate criminal intent under
the traditional law of robbery and extortion, there are only two examples
that are of assistance in discerning under what circumstances wages can
be extorted. It is generally held that robbery is not involved when force
is used to collect a debtY0  A New York court apparently has arrived at
the same conclusion under the extortion statute on the grounds that the
ultimate object is "not the 'lucri caused which must always characterize
the act."'5 7 Under the common law of robbery a forced sale for less than
the value of the goods is robbery, while a forced sale for a fair and adequate
consideration may not be. In the famous Fisherman's Case,8 where fish
were taken from a fisherman against his will, doubt was expressed con-
cerning the justification of a robbery conviction because the fisherman was
paid more than the selling price of the fish. The court's doubt was ap-
parently predicated on the belief that there was "no such enormity in the
intention of the wrongdoer as is implied in the notion of felony." 5 9
The cases involving the collection of a debt by force would prevent
an extortion conviction where an employee procured by force the payment
of wages due under an existing contract. They might also protect a de-
mand by an employee that an employer who hired a non-union man in
violation of a closed shop contract must pay an amount equivalent to the
wages paid the non-union man. Here the demand is for a debt owed under
the contract as damages for breach of the contract.60
Where an employment contract is procured by force, however, the
cases concerning the collection of a debt are of no assistance to the em-
ployee since they involve debts incurred without coercion.0 Here the
55. The Commissioners concluded that a taking of property without a wrongful
intent amounts at most to a trespass. In their note to robbery they said, "This
definition embodies substantially the elements suggested by 2 REv. STAT., 667, § 55,
56; the word 'wrongful' being substituted for 'feloniously.' Three elements are
necessary to constitute the offense of robbery, as it is generally understood. 1. A
taking of property from the person or presence of its possessor. 2. A wrongful
intent amounts at most to a trespass. In their note to robbery they said: "This
The first and second of these elements, the third being wanting, constitute simple
larceny. The first and third, without the second, amount at most to a trespass. .. ."
COMMISSIONERS' REPORT, NEW YORK PENAL CODE § 280 "(1865). Compare treatment
of theft by the American Law Institute in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 206, comment
b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) (". . . a genuine belief in one's legal right shall in all
cases be a defense to theft. Persons who take only what they believe themselves
entitled to constitute no significant threat to our property system and manifest no
character trait worse than ignorance.")
56. See cases at note 53 supra.
57. People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318, 324, 271 N.Y. Supp. 450, 456 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1934). But see People v. Conforti, 72 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1947).
58. 2 EAST, PLEAs OF THE CROWN 661-662 (1803).
59. 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 236 (7th ed. 1795).
60. See Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1948) where under similar cir-
cumstances the NLRB dismissed a charge of featherbedding on the grounds that the
demand was made under color of right.
61. Compare McKeown v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 381, 246 Pac. 659 (1926).
1040 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
Fisherman's Case may be of some aid in a situation where the employer
admits that he needs another man but declines for some reason to hire
this particular employee. Coerced employment may be justified by the
fact that the employee performs a necessary service and gives full and
adequate consideration for the wages paid. There are, however, obvious
difficulties in applying the forced-sale-of-fish analogy to the case of forced
employment since the employment contract has the unique characteristics
of any personal service contract. The Fisherman's Case would be of little
assistance in a situation where the employer insists that another man is
not needed. To justify this coerced employment requires a conclusion that
an "employee" can overrule the seasoned judgment of the employer con-
cerning the efficient running of his own plant.
The Fisherman's Case analogy is difficult to apply even in instances
involving demands by present employees for a reasonable wage increase,
for pay during vacations, rest periods, or travel time, for room and board,
or time-and-a-half. The employees may argue that these demands are
merely incidental to regular, necessary employment and are means to secure
a reasonable wage in exchange for valuable services rendered to the em-
ployer. To accept this argument, however, is to admit that the wrongdoer
can force the fisherman to sell his fish at a price less than that demanded
by the latter. The essence of the Fisherman's rule-if it is a rule 02---is
that the wrongdoer unquestionably gave fair consideration for the fish.
A Suggested Approach.-The fact that the traditional claim-of-right
theory under the law of robbery and extortion affords limited protection for
wage demands is not surprising. Few if any prosecutions for the exaction
of wages have arisen under these laws, and courts have not been forced
to delineate the requisite felonious intent. An attempt to define this intent
when labor conduct is involved must of necessity be tempered by the climate
of public opinion about such activity. Federal safeguards such as those
embodied in the Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia, Railway Labor, Wagner, and
Taft-Hartley Acts are particularly significant. Before the passage of the
Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts, there was no Federal legislation which expressly
made wage exactions of any type an improper labor objective. Federal
courts had held that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts t1 prevented
the application of the Sherman Act to featherbedding wage demands.0 4
State courts had ruled that little Norris-LaGuardia Acts prohibited the
62. See KENNY's OUTUNES OF CRIMINAL LAW 243 (Turner ed. 1952).
63. See notes 100-102 infra.
64. United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191, 195, 196 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. United States v. International Hod Carriers, 313 U.S. 539
(1941) (strikes and threats to strike to deter use of a labor-saving device or to
compel employment of the same number of men who would have been employed but
for the device). See also United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 47
F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), aff'd without opinion, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) ; United
States v. Bay Area Painters and Decorators, Joint Comm., Inc. 49 F. Supp. 733,
737 (N.D. Cal. 1943). See text at note 110 infra.
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enjoining of featherbedding.65 Moreover, the Lea Act was emasculated by
judicial construction,66 and the Taft-Hartley Act was not intended to con-
demn the bogus type-setter or the stand-by musician.
In light of this history, it is suggested that there may be no extortive
intent under the Hobbs Act in the coerced employment situation where
the employee makes a bona fide offer to work, even though he intends to
accept wages if work is not permitted to be done. The Act may proscribe
only the exacting of "protection" money, i.e., payments where work is
refused to be done, or is done or offered to be done merely as a sham.
7
Sham for this purpose would have a very limited definition. In certain
extreme instances, it may include a non-existent job, in the sense that the
job is completely foreign to the employer's customary operations. It
may also encompass jobs for which the "employee" is obviously unqualified.
Finally, it may include the situation where the wages demanded are totally
disproportionate to the amount of work to be done.
Such a limitation on extortive intent was perhaps in the mind of
Judge Learned Hand when he said in the Local 807 case that "The wrong is
the extortion of money without quid pro quo, and a bona fide tender is
the only step that the putative employee can ever take towards perform-
ance. .. ." 68 The Supreme Court in the Local 807 case never ruled
on Judge Hand's interpretation of the requisite criminal intent; it held
that where the "employee" made a bona fide offer to work, he was pro-
tected by the wage provisos in the original Act.6 9 Absent the wage pro-
visos, the Court might nevertheless have held that extortion was not in-
volved where the "employee" offered to work, because there was "no such
enormity in the intention of the wrongdoer as is implied in the notion of" ?0
the serious felony of extortion. 71 This limitation on the nature of felonious
intent in the Hobbs Act would not necessarily make the conviction in
65. Motion Picture Mach. Union v. Rialto Theatre Co., 25 Del. Ch. 347, 17
A.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Steerman v. Krouse, 36 Pa. D. & C. 475 (1939);
Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, 108 N.J. Eq. 257,-154 Atl. 759 (Ct. Err. & App.
1931). Contra: Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1941); Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass.
413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918).
66. See text at note 6 supra.
67. Sham payments involved extortion under the original Act, see note 16 upra.
Apparently Judges McLaughlin and Staley dissenting in Kemble would limit
the Act to protection payments. Judge McLaughlin stated that the Act cannot in-
clude broad featherbedding provisions like the Lea Act, because the Supreme
Court in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), when answering the argument
that Lea singled out radio employees for featherbedding regulation, failed to refer
to the alleged prohibitions in the Hobbs Act. However, it is the policy of the
Court not to interpret statutes when the instant facts do not raise issues thereunder.
68. United States v. Local 807, I.B.T., 118 F.2d 684, 687 (2d Cir. 1941).
69. See text at note 14 supra.
70. See text at note 59 upra.
71. There is language in the Local 807 case indicating that the Court might
have drawn such a conclusion, see notes 15 and 16 supra. It is doubtful whether
the court would have affirmed a conviction of the Teamsters even without the wage
provisos since then a host of featherbedding convictions would have been possible
under the Act, including that of stand-by musicians.
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the Kemble case improper. Since the work was nearly completed when
Kemble made his demands for a full day's wages, any work done by Kemble
or a member of his union would have been a sham. 72
The suggested interpretation of extortive intent gives no effect to the
omission of the wage provisos after the Local 807 case and frustrates the
obvious congressional aim to punish violent disruptions of interstate
commerce by labor.7 3 The paradox of the legislative history is that Congress,
so determined to punish labor violence, may have overshot its mark. By
choosing the compound felony of extortion as its weapon, it required the
proving of felonious intent 74 which may not be involved in the coerced em-
ployment situation where the "employee" makes a bona fide offer to
work.
The justification for giving no effect to the omission of the wage pro-
visos becomes apparent when the alternatives are considered. (1) Minimal
effect could be given to the omission by construing Hobbs as proscribing
like the featherbedding provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,75 a bona fide
offer to work where the "employee" intended to accept wages even if em-
ployment were refused. (2) Additional effect can be given by a conclusion
that the Hobbs Act, like the featherbedding sanctions of the Lea Act,76
prohibits a demand for employment which is unnecessary to efficient opera-
tion by the employer. (3) Giving maximum effect would result in the
Racketeering Act, unlike either Taft-Hartley or Lea, proscribing a demand
for employment which is necessary to efficient operation by the employer.
The legislative history indicates that Congress focused upon the prob-
lem of the Local 807 case as one of improper labor means (violence) rather
than improper labor objectives (featherbedding demands).7 The House
Committee on the Judiciary, which ultimately proposed the Hobbs Act on
the floor of the House, rejected two alternative bills which dealt specifically
with featherbedding. 78 Moreover, when Congress imposed sanctions on
72. Under this theory, the failure of the Kemble court to reverse the conviction
in light of the fact that the trial court gave no charge regarding felonious intent
can best be explained by the doctrine of non-prejudicial error, in that the offer was
a sham as a matter of law. It is questionable, however, whether the application
of this doctrine is appropriate in Kemble, since the essential consideration is the de-
fendant's state of mind. Kemble may have felt that his demands were not a sham;
see text at note 6 supra for a similar question under the Lea Act.
73. See note 17 supra.
74. This was articulated by Judge Staley in dissent in the Kemble case. He
noted that "[tihe fact that physical violence was threatened should not be allowed
to confuse the picture. If Congress had enacted legislation making the obstruction
of commerce by violence or threats of violence a crime, these defendants would stand
properly convicted. But no such offenses were ever made into law; and this court
should not judicially legislate such offenses. The felonious taking of property from
another by the use of violence or threats of violence, whether it be denominated
extortion or robbery, is really a compound felony, for the actor Is offended both
the person and the property of the victim." 198 F.2d 889, 899 (Italics added).
75. See text at note 93 infra.
76. See text at note 4 supra.
77. See note 17 supra.
78. Hearings, supra note 33, at 104, 121, 122, 123. These bills contained broad
provisions of the Lea Act type.
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featherbedding under the Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts, it used specific statu-
tory language.7 9 Furthermore, the legislature penalized coercion of feather-
bedding under the Lea Act by a maximum sentence of one year, whereas
the maximum penalty under the Hobbs Act is twenty years. Finally, Con-
gress did not rely solely on the Hobbs Act to control featherbedding since
after its passage featherbedding was made an unfair labor practice under
the Taft-Hartley Act.
Since congressional history does not indicate that Congress envisioned
the Hobbs Act as a weapon against featherbedding demands, featherbedding
as defined in the Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts should not supply the requisite
criminal intent under Hobbs. Unlike the Lea Act proscription, guilt should
not depend upon whether the "employee" intended to exact wages for work
unnecessary to efficient operation by the employer. The severe penalities
of Hobbs should not rest upon the ex post facto determinations of time-
and-motion-study experts.8 0 Moreover, sanctions under Hobbs, unlike
Taft-Hartley, should not depend upon whether the "employee" making the
offer to work intended to exact wages only for work permitted to be done.
The Taft-Hartley rule would force the "employee" to exert continued pres-
sure on the employer until he was permitted to work since then there would
be little doubt that the employee intended to exact wages only for work
permitted to be done. As Judge Learned Hand said in the Local 807
case, "Guilt is personal to the wrong-doer; it would be absurd to make it
depend upon the fact that the employee had not gratuitously persisted in
pressing his unwelcome services upon the employer. That would excuse
the more heinous offence, and penalize the more venial.. ," 81
A conclusion that Hobbs will not punish featherbedding proscribed
by the Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts is consistent with the history of the New
York type statute. There is no indication that these statutes were enacted
or have been applied as sanctions upon. featherbedding. They were aimed
at racketeering of the "Kelly and Dillinger" type and have been used against
labor activity only in the Compagna and Nick 82 situations where the labor
leaders' objective is individual enrichment rather than union benefit.8
3
Thus, a conclusion that extortion is not involved when an "employee"
makes a bona fide offer to work is not at all improbable in states having
the New York type statute. Such a limitation would seem vital in light
of the fact that threats to strike and striking have been held to supply the
requisite coercive activity.8 4 Without this limitation, striking to force em-
ployment of the bogus type-setter or the intermission-playing musician, or
79. See note 4 and text at note 8 supra.
80. The Supreme Court stated that under the Lea Act the fact that an employer
said that a particular job was unnecesary was not conclusive, United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
81. United States v. Local 807, I.B.T., 118 F.2d 684, 687 (2d Cir. 1941).
82. See text at note 12 mtpra.
83. See cases at note 37 mtpra.
84. Ibid.
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to secure a reasonable wage increase would be extortion. Felonious intent
defined in terms of featherbedding is improper; traditional robbery and
extortion criteria are difficult to apply; and the possible protective pro-
visions of a Title Two are not available under the state statutes. Since
Congress chose to enact the New York type statute, federal courts should
give great weight to how extortion would be defined in state courts. Only
after extortion is adequately defined should they look at the interaction of
the substantive crime with the possible labor safeguards in Title Two.
Title Two
Immediately after the Local 807 case, Congress passed a statute similar
to the Hobbs Act in its present form except that Title Two was omitted.
This statute was vetoed by the President as part of the larger Case Bill.
In his veto message, the President stated that "On its face, this section does
no more than prohibit all persons, whether union representatives or em-
ployees or others, from interfering with interstate commerce by robbery and
extortion." He added that he was in "full accord with the objectives" of the
Hobbs Bill but that "some question may arise from the fact that . .
[the bill] . . . omits from the original act the provision that it was not to
be construed so as to 'impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of
bona fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof'." The President concluded that "it should be made clear in express
terms that . . . [the bill] . . . does not make it a felony to strike and
picket peacefully and to take other legitimate and peaceful concerted ac-
tion." -5 Congress satisfied this Presidential desire when it reenacted the
Hobbs Bills by incorporating Title Two 86 which provided that the Act
"shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect" the Clayton, Norris-
LaGuardia, Railway Labor, and amended Wagner (Taft-Hartley) Acts.8 7
The court in the Kemble case interpreted Title Two to mean the
same as § 6 of the earlier Act.88 This interpretation overlooks the fact
that, at least in form, Title Two is quite different from § 6. A more ap-
propriate approach to Title Two requires first an investigation of the labor
safeguards provided by the enumerated statutes, and then a construction
of the phrase that nothing in the Hobbs Act shall be "construed to repeal,
modify or affect" these statutes.
85. 92 CONG. REc. 6676 (1946).
86. Congressman Hobbs said, "Let me point out that when you are striking,
when you are picketing, when you are organizing a labor union, or engaging in any
legitimate labor function, then you are operating under some one of those four laws
that are specifically exempted in this bill by title IIL" [Later called title II].
91 ConG. REc. 11900 (1946). The President in his message accompanying his signa-
ture of the bill stated that the Attorney General "makes reference, in particular, to
title II of the bill. .. .. [He] also advises that the legislative history shows that the
bill is not intended to deprive labor of any of its recognized rights, including the
right to strike and to picket, and to take other legitimate and peaceful concerted
action." 92 CoNG. REc. 8299 (1946).
87. See note 19 supra.
88. See text at note 25 supra.
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Taft-Hartley Act.-Although the amended Wagner (Taft-Hartley)
Act safeguards labor's right to strike and picket,89 this protection is by no
means absolute. It is possible that employees who strike against an unfair
labor practice committed by an employer may lose the protection of the Act.
It has been held that their usual right to reinstatement is sacrificed where
the strike is a sit down strike 90 or mutiny.9 ' Furthermore, under the Taft-
Hartley Act it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to engage in certain specified activities. Prohibited conduct includes,
for example, striking or picketing to exert secondary pressure on an em-
ployer, striking to force an employer to bargain when another union is
certified, jurisdictional striking, and striking or picketing to enforce feather-
bedding demands.
92
This featherbedding provision must be analyzed closely since it is
Taft-Hartley's only specific prohibition on improper wage exactions and
is therefore most intimately connected with coerced employment.
In light of the decisions by the Supreme Court involving the bogus
type-setter and intermission-playing musician, 93 the featherbedding pro-
visions of Taft-Hartley do not apply when work is done or offered to be
done as consideration for wages exacted or attempted to be exacted, al-
though this work is unnecessary to efficient operation by the employer.
On the other hand, the court was not forced to pass on the validity of an
offer to work coupled with an alternative demand that wages be paid
even though no work is permitted to be done. This practice would seem
to be improper because of the alternative intent to exact wages without
working. Featherbedding clearly is involved where there is no offer to
work, and may be found where work is done or offered to be done merely
as a sham in the sense that little or no work is done or offered to be done.
Finally, an unfair labor practice is probably involved in the Compagna and
Nick situations 94 where a labor leader makes no pretension about employ-
ment but merely feathers his own nest.
Where a union strikes or pickets to force employment and this activity
under the Taft-Hartley Act results in loss of right to reinstatement or
amounts to an unfair labor practice, Title Two probably would not pre-
vent a conviction under the Hobbs Act. Such a conviction would not "re-
peal, modify or affect" the protective spirit of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
in its own jurisdictional realm provides no safeguard for this labor ac-
tivity. However, where a union strikes or pickets to force employment
and this activity does not invoke sanctions under the Act, Title Two prob-
89. 61 STAT. 140, 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (Supp. 1952).
90. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
91. Southern S.S. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
92. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (Supp. 1952).
93. See text at note 9 supra.
94. See text at note 12 supra.
1046 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
ably does prevent a conviction under the Hobbs Act.95 Such a conviction
would "repeal, modify or affect" the Taft-Hartley Act which provides a
safeguard for this labor activity. It is specious to argue that a Hobbs
conviction would not "repeal, modify or affect" the Act because despite
the conviction the labor activity in question is still not an unfair labor prac-
tice or enjoinable under Taft-Hartley. Congress added Title Two to the
Hobbs Act to prevent convictions where the conduct in question was
within the protective spirit of the enumerated statutes, not to prevent a
possible change in the application of those statutes because of the Hobbs
Act. It is difficult to see how extortion penalties under the Hobbs Act
could authorize any such change.9
It seems reasonable to conclude that the Taft-Hartley Act will pro-
vide only a limited protection to labor conduct otherwise amounting to
extortion under Hobbs. Although the featherbedding provisions are nar-
rowly drawn, other labor "improprieties" will eliminate the protections
even when striking or picketing is involved. Moreover, where the coercive
activity is labor violence, the Act will probably afford no safeguards.
Only in the situation where the violence is merely incidental to the coercive
conduct, such as occasional violence along the picket line, would a dif-
ferent conclusion be possible. Even a strike becomes improper under
Taft-Hartley where its fundamental characteristic is violence, e.g., a sit-
down strike.
97
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.-Section 20 of the Clayton Act 98
provides that certain enumerated labor activities shall not "be con-
sidered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." This
section was emasculated by the Supreme Court in Duplex Co. v. Deering '9
95. A difficulty with this proposition is that a jury in applying Title Two may
have to invade the realm of the NLRB and decide whether the activities in question
were unfair labor practices. The District Court in the Kemble case gave a general
charge to the jury regarding the protections of the labor statutes in Title Two.
96. Title Two includes a section of the Sherman Act which exempts labor ac-
tivity from Sherman proceedings, 15 U.S.C. §17 (1946). It is difficult to under-
stand this inclusion since a possible extortion conviction under Hobbs would not re-
move the Sherman exemption.
97. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
98. "And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising,
or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place
where such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtain-
ing or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party
to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any
person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of
value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes;
or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such
dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph
be construed or held to be violations of any law of the United States." 38 STAT.
738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. §52 (1946) (Italics added).
99. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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where it was held that § 20 would not prevent a labor conviction under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act unless union activities were directed against an
employer by his own employees. Congress then passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act which provides that when there is a "labor dispute," 100
federal courts have no power to enjoin certain enumerated labor activities
not involving violence or fraud."1" Moreover, even with violence or fraud,
certain procedural and substantive safeguards must be satisfied before an
injunction may issue.1 2  In United States v. Hutcheson,'°3 the union ac-
tivity involved a strike, an attempt to cause a sympathy strike, boycotting
of the employer's product, a secondary boycott of both a contractor doing
work for the employer and the employer's lessee, and picketing of the em-
ployer. The Supreme Court held that § 20 of the Clayton Act prevented a
criminal conviction under the Sherman Act. The Court stated: "The
Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act
by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the
later Act. In this light § 20 removes all such allowable conduct from the
taint of being a 'violation of any law of the United States', including the
Sherman Law." '04 The Court concluded that ". . So long as a union
acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the
licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment
100. "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or condi-
tions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proxi-
mate relation of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113
(1946).
101. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or grow-
ing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform
any work or to remain in any relation of employment; . . . (e) Giving publicity
to the existence of, or the fact involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; (f)
Assembling peacebly to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in
a labor dispute; (g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any
of the acts heretofore specified; (h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to
do any of the acts heretofore specified ... " 47 STAT. 70-1 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1946).
102. Injunction may be granted in a labor dispute only after hearing the testi-
mony of witnesses in open court (with the opportunity for cross-examination) and
after a finding of fact to the effect: "(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened
and will be committed unless restrained . . . (b) That substantial and irreparable
injury to complainant's property will follow; (c) That as to each item of relief
granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; (d) That complainant has no
adequate remedy at law; and (e) That the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protec-
tion. . . ." 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1946). Moreover, no injunction
may issue to any complainant ". . . who has failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available govern-
mental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29
U.S.C. § 108 (1946).
103. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
104. Id. at 236.
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regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfish-
ness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means. . . ,, o5
In United States v. Carrozzo,0 6 a union employed strikes and threats
to strike to deter use of a labor-saving device, or in the alternative to com-
pel employment of the same number of men who would have been employed
but for the device. A federal district court held that this activity involved
a "labor dispute" concerning "terms and conditions of employment" within
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and therefore § 20 of the Clayton Act prevented
a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court affirmed
this decision on the basis of the Hutcheson case.
0 7
The Carrozzo result is probably unaffected by the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act.'08 It is immaterial that the Act makes certain featherbedding
activities unfair labor practices and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is ex-
pressly repealed to the limited extent that the NLRB "may" get an injunc-
tion in an unfair labor practice situation. 0 9 This injunctive discretion was
given to the Board to facilitate its application of the policies of the Taft-
Hartley Act, not to overturn the protective provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and § 20 of the Clayton Act. The Taft-Hartley Act in the
unfair labor practice situation makes no pretense of permitting the most
potent of all anti-labor weapons-an employer injunction." 0
On the basis of the Carrozzo case, coerced employment involves a
"labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act where, under threat of
strike, work is offered to be done as consideration for wages attempted to
be exacted, although this work is unnecessary to efficient operation by the
employer. It is probably immaterial that wages will be accepted even
though no work is permitted to be done. On the other hand, there is
some question whether a "labor dispute" would be involved where the
demand is for "protection payments," i.e., payments where work is refused
to be done or where work is done or offered to be done merely as a sham."'
105. Id. at 232. Accord: Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (suit for
injunction and treble damages under the Sherman Act dismissed despite the fact
that the defendant union forced the plaintiff trucker out of business solely as punish-
ment for the alleged murder of a union man) ; cf. Bakery Sales Drivers Local
Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 161 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
106. 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam sub nont United States v.
International Hod Carriers, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
107. See also United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 47 F. Supp.
304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), aff'd without opinion, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) (preliminary injunc-
tion under Sherman Act denied where union boycotted broadcasting system to force
a station within that system to employ stand-by musicians); United States v. Bay
Area Painters and Decorators Joint Comm. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
108. Teller, The Taft-Hartley Act and Govermment by Injunction, 1 LAB. LAW
J. 40, 45, 46 (1949).
109. 61 STAT. 146 (1948), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (Supp. 1952).
110. See Amalgamated Ass'n v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th
Cir. 1948); California Ass'n v. Building and Const. Tr. Council, 178 F.2d 175 (9th
Cir. 1949).
111. Sham for this purpose is probably the same as sham for the purpose of
felonious intent, see text after note 67 supra. It has been held that a "labor dispute"
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Clearly in the Compagna and Nick situations :12 no "labor dispute" is in-
volved but merely an attempt at individual enrichment.
Where union striking or picketing does not involve a "labor dispute"
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Title Two probably would not prevent
a conviction under the Hobbs Act. Norris-LaGuardia would not be re-
pealed, modified or affected since it provides no safeguard for non-"labor
disputes." However, where striking or picketing does involve a "labor
dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Title Two probably would pre-
vent a conviction under the Hobbs Act. It is reasonable to conclude, as
did the Hutcheson court, that conduct which is allowable on the equity side
of the court should not become the road to prison in a criminal proceeding. 113
Moreover, Hutcheson says that § 20 of the Clayton Act precludes a con-
viction for a "violation of any law of the United States" when a "labor
dispute" is involved.114  A completely literal reading of § 20 is perhaps
unjustified because then even a breach-of-the-peace conviction might be
improper in a federal court where a "labor dispute" is involved. However,
such a consideration has no effect upon the application of the Hobbs Act.
Title Two of the Hobbs Act e.xpressly provides that the Act shall not be
construed to "repeal, modify or affect" § 20 of the Clayton Act.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts will provide an extensive safeguard for labor conduct charged as
being extortion under Hobbs. Where the coercive activity is striking or
picketing which involves a "labor dispute," these Acts will provide pro-
tection although the objective of the coercive activity is to force feather-
bedding. On the other hand, where the coercive activity is labor violence,
they will probably afford no substantive safeguards. Only in a situation
where the violence is merely incidental to the coercive conduct would a
different conclusion be possible. Even picketing becomes enjoinable under
the acts where its fundamental characteristic is violence, e.g., mass picket-
ing."5  However, there are procedural safeguards which must be met
is involved where a master plumbers association and a local union of plumbers at-
tempted to exact fees from a builder for the "privilege" of installing plumbing
equipment. Peterson v. Master Plumbing Ass'n, 44 F. Supp. 908 (D. Nev. 1942).
This case can be distinguished from "protection payments" on the ground that the
attempted exaction was incident to an offer to work.
112. See text at note 12 mtpra.
113. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234 (1941).
114. There are indications that § 20 of the Clayton Act prevents the application
of the Sherman Act to striking or picketing which does not involve a "labor dispute."
See Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (union punishing employer for alleged
murder of union man). If this interpretation of § 20 is adopted for the purposes
of Title Two, § 20 would preclude a Hobbs conviction even in the Compagna and
Nick situations. It seems desirable therefore to limit the Hunt case contruction of
§ 20 to the application of the Sherman Act. This limitation is reasonable in light
of the fact that Hunt's interpretation of § 20 was motivated by a feeling that the
Sherman Act is particularly inapplicable when labor conduct is in question. Cf.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 270 (1947), where it was
said that for injunction purposes, the protections of Norris-LaGuardia are more
inclusive than those of Clayton.
115. General Electric Co. v. Gojack, 68 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ind. 1946); Lake
Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. Mayo, 20 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. La. 1935); Cater
Const. Co. v. Nischwitz, 111 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1940).
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under the Norris-LaGuardia Act before an injunction can issue against
violence in a labor dispute.116  Although injunctive power is thus limited,
it is not necessarily a sequitur that a Hobbs conviction is thereby pre-
cluded by Title Two. The Supreme Court has said that criminal pro-
ceedings can be entirely in order despite the fact that an injunction is im-
proper under the Norris-LaGuardia Act because of a failure to comply
with one of its safeguards. 1 7
Railway Labor Act.-Only brief mention need be made of the signifi-
cance of the inclusion of the Railway Labor Act in Title Two. The fact
that this Act protects the right to strike 118 would seem to be of little.
consequence in light of the fact that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts apply equally well to labor disputes in the railroad industry." 9 There
are no indications of labor protections afforded by the Railway Labor Act
which are not provided by Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia.
There are two instances, however, when a peaceful strike is enjoinable
despite the Railway Labor, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. An in-
junction is permissible when a union strikes without first meeting the con-
ditions precedent under the Railway Act to the right to strike.12 0 But this
failure to meet the conditions precedent may not necessarily mean that
the protections of Title Two are lost. An injunction in this instance is
merely a temporary restraint to insure the use of the procedures of the
Railway Labor Act designed to facilitate the settlement of labor disputes.
If these procedures prove ineffective, striking is not then enjoinable.
The other instance where a strike is enjoinable despite the Railway,
Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts is where the strike is against the
Federal Government which has seized the railways because of a national
emergency affecting the war effort.' 2 1 Likewise, in similar seizures in
industries other than the railways, the labor statutes do not preclude the
enjoining of a strike against the United States, since the government is
not an "employer" under Norris-LaGuardia. 12 Moreover, there is dictum
to the effect that even in the absence of government seizure, a strike is
enjoinable when it threatens to disrupt the structure of the national so-
ciety.1' In these instances Title Two may afford no protection.
116. See note 102 supra.
117. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50,
63 (1944).
118. 48 STAT. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §152 (1946).
119. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. RR., 321 U.S. 50
(1944) (labor violence enjoinable only after Norris-LaGuardia procedural safeguards
had been complied with).
120. Anderson v. Bigelow, 130 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1942) reversing on other
grounds, In re Virginia & Truckee Ry., 36 F. Supp. 119 (D. Nev. 1941) in which
a decision on failure to meet conditions was implicit in the issuance of an injunction.
121. United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485
(D.D.C. 1948).
122. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
123. United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485,
487 (D.D.C. 1948).
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The net effect of Title Two.-A final observation need be made about
the interrelation of Title Two and the substantive crime of extortion. Un-
der the proposed interpretation, Title Two would afford protection in the
coerced employment situation where the coercive activity consists of peace-
ful striking or picketing which involves a "labor dispute" under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. A "labor dispute" requires proof merely of a bona fide
offer to work.12 4  Therefore, it is immaterial in the case of peaceful
striking or picketing whether or not the felonious intent required by the
substantive crime of extortion 125 precludes a conviction where a bona fide
offer to work is made. The limitations imposed by the requisite felonious
intent are vital, however, where the labor activity is fundamentally violent
and hence unprotected by Title Two.
A conclusion that the requirement of felonious intent precludes a con-
viction where a bona fide offer to work is made, probably renders Title Two
surplusage. 26 This conclusion is not unreasonable in light of the legisla-
tive history which surrounded the passage of the Hobbs Act. State stat-
utes of the New York type do not have protective provisions like Title Two.
It may have been inserted in the Act in an overly cautious gesture toward
union rights. It is difficult to conclude that the President vetoed the origi-
nal Hobbs Bill because it lacked a Title Two; the Hobbs Bill just hap-
pened to be part of the larger Case Bill which the President rejected. In
his veto message, the President merely said that "some question may arise"
from the fact that section 6 of the original Act was omitted.12 7 It is quite
understandable that Congress would take the course of least resistance and
return the bill with a "Title Two" included, thereby cleaning its hands
of charges of anti-labor legislation.
SUMMARY
The Hobbs Act is the confused product of legislative reaction to vio-
lent disruption of interstate commerce by labor. It is indeed doubtful
whether Congress fully appreciated the various ramifications of the appli-
cation of the crime of extortion to wage demands, particularly the pos-
sible limitations imposed by a requirement of felonious intent. It is un-
fortunate that the Supreme Court, by refusing to grant certiorari in the
Kemble case, has denied itself the opportunity of comprehensive judicial
clarification. In the absence of such a guide, only an attempt can be made
to resolve the conflicts raised.
124. See text after note 110 Vrtpra.
125. See text at note 67 supra for conclusions as to felonious intent.
126. This view is not inconsistent with legislative history. The Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary stated that "[I]t is not the intention of the com-
mittee that . . . [Title Two] . . . be interpreted as authorizing any unlawful acts,
particularly those amounting to robbery and extortion. The need for the legislation was
emphasized by the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v.
Local 807. . . ." H.R. No. 238, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.; U.S.C. CONG. SE. 1360,
1370 (1946).
127. See text at note 85 supra.
